WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE
The problems highlighted by the Graham II case, as well as the academic work product cases, stem from the all-or-nothing nature of the work for hire provision itself.'° A finding that an engagement is a work for hire under the statute automatically results in all ownership being vested in the hiring party." This result, dictated by the statute, often contradicts business norms and the understanding of one or both of the parties.
The all-or-nothing nature of the work for hire doctrine is exacerbated by the judiciary's focus, most notably in Communityfor Creaive Non-Violence v. Reid, on the issue of the existence of an employment relationship rather than on the more relevant issue of whether the work was created "within the scope" of the "employment."' 2 This Article proposes amending 17 U.S.C. § 101 and 201 to emphasize the reasonable expectations of the parties rather than the existence (or nonexistence) of an employment relationship. The proposed amendment takes into account the business realities involved where one party is being paid by another party during the period in which the former party creates work to be used by the hiring party. In Part II, I provide an overview of the work for hire doctrine, and discuss how the courts have analyzed and developed the doctrine. In this section, I exane both the Graham II case and the Miller-Harvard dispute and explain how the existing conception of work for hire fails to capture the expectations of the parties.
In Part III, I set forth my proposed changes to 17 U.S.C. §5 101 and 201. First, I propose that a written agreement be required in order for employee works to be considered works for hire. This proposal reverses the existing pro-employer statutory default. In addition, I advocate abolishing the all-or-nothing concept of ownership in the current statute in favor of a more particularized analysis that emphasizes the expectations of the parties. Instead of focusing on the existence of an employment relationship, the courts should focus on the intent of the parties with respect to the work. Did the parties intend for the employer to have an rights to use the work? In order to address that issue, the courts will need to inquire into the purpose of the employment and industy norms. If such an inquiry students and funding to develop distance learning programs. . . . With institutions now seeing a potential financial windfall to be made in distance education, many institutions have adopted copyright policies under which home institutions have asserted more rights to what the professor does in his or her classroom, particularly when the lecture or course materials are put in an electronic medium. Id at 434.
'o See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (2000) (stating that "the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared.., owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright").
11 Id. of 1909 , ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1075 , 1088 (1909 ("mhe word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire.').
The 1909 Act, however, did not define a "work made for hire." Graham II, 380 F.3d at 634.
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(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all the rights comprised in the copyright.
Thus, where the work is created by an employee within the scope of employment, Section 101 reverses the general presumption under the Copyright Act that the creator is the author of the work, and therefore, the owner of the copyright to that work. In the case of a work for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author and owns the copyright unless the parties have otherwise agreed in writing. 9 The determination of whether a work is a work for hire within the meaning of the Copyright Act also determines who owns all the rights contained within the copyright of that work. Accordingly, the classification of a work determines many aspects of the copyright in addition to ownership, including the termination of the license grant,° the s 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) . The Section further states that:
[a] 'supplementary work' is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an 'instructional text' is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. (2000) . 2o Under the Copyright Act, the creator of a work may terminate an assignment of rights to another party after thirty-five years. If, however, the work is a work for hire, the termination right does not apply. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000) .
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j. INTELL PROP. L duration of the copyright, 2 and renewal rights.' In addition, only the owner of the copyright may create or authorize derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. The work for hire doctrine determines copyright ownership in the absence of an express written agreement between the parties. 24 This statutory default favors ownership by the hiring party where the hiring party is an employer and the work was prepared by an employee "within the scope of his or her employment."
5 In that case, the work is deemed to be a work for hire regardless of how the parties characterize their relationship or the nature of the work. The employer is considered the author and the initial copyright vests with the employer.
6
The employer thus owns all the copyrights unless the parties have agreed in writing to transfer ownership to the employee.
If, however, the creator is not an employee, the default rule regarding ownership favors the creator/independent contractor.28 In that case, a written agreement must exist between the parties in order for the work to be considered "made for hire." ' 29 If such a writing does not exist, then the work is deemed not to be a work for hire within the meaning of the statute and copyright ownership belongs to the independent contractor.
30
The language of the statute, and court decisions interpreting that language, indicate that an agreement between an employee and an employer characterizing the nature of the relationship would be insufficient to resolve the issue of 21 Under 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), copyright in a work created on or afterJanuary 1, 1978 endures for the life of the author and seventy years thereafter. In the case of a work for hire, however, the copyright endures for a term of ninety-five years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. 302(c) (2000) .
' Only the author is entitled to the renewal rights set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 304. 23 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) .
24
See Graham II, 380 F.3d 624, 634 (2d Cir. 2004 Inc. v. Simon. 33 In Marvel Characters, the parties, a comic book author and a publisher, entered into a settlement agreement nearly thirty years after the completion of the work. The court analyzed the settlement agreement under section 304(c) of the 1976 Act which states that transfers of copyrights are subject to termination unless the work is one made for hire. 34 Under section 304(c)(5), a copyright may be terminated "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.
35
The court in Marvel held that the settlement agreement between the parties was an "agreement to the contrary" and that the defendant comic book author was not bound by the statement in the settlement agreement that the work was one created "for hire.
36
Because the court opinion in Marvel focused on the issue of work for hire within the context of section 304(c), it is unclear whether, and to what extent, it would apply to an agreement entered into by the partiespriorto the creation of the work. There is authority supporting the view that agreements, at least those in favor of employers, would not be upheld. The Marvel court cited Nimmer on Copyright to support its holding that the parties' characterization of their relationship did not conclude the issue of whether the work was in fact created within the scope of an employment relationship:
The parties to a grant may not agree that a work shall be deemed one made "for hire" in order to avoid the termination provisions if a "for hire" relationship ... does not in fact exist between them.
31 360 F.3d 644, 650 (7th Cir. 2004 
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Such an avoidance device would be contrary to the statutory provision that "[t]ermination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary." ...
[I]t is the relationship that in fact exists between the parties, and not their description: of that relationship that is determinative.
3 7
As the Second Circuit noted, courts engaging in an analysis of work for hire have "focused on the actual relationship between the parties, rather than the language of their agreements."" As the court in Marvel further noted:
[T]he manner in which the parties designate the relationship is not controlling, and if an act done by one person in behalf of another is in its essential nature one of agency, the one is the agent of such other notwithstanding that he or she is not so called. Conversely, the mere use of the word "agent" by parties in their contract does not make one an agent who, in fact, is not such.
39
Thus the determination of whether a work is for hire will depend upon the results of a factual inquiry regarding whether an employment relationship between the hiring party and the creator exists and, if so, whether the work created was "within the scope of employment. (1987) All work within the scope of employment now constitutes work made for hire, and while the incidents of copyright ownership remain subject to negotiation between employer and employee, only a writing signed by both parties may rebut the presumption in favor of the employer's ownership. Furthermore, authorship of work clearly created within the scope of employment now vests irrebuttably in the employer.... Accordingly, the circumstances under which the work was created and the expectations of the parties have now become largely irrelevant. The dispositive issue is whether production of scholarly material is "within the scope of employment," that is, a part of the job. Id. at 598-99.
[Vol. 13:337 WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE emplqyee/employer relationship. 4 ' Therefore, it would be a mistake, albeit a tempting one, to view written agreements between the parties as conclusive of whether a work can safely be labeled one for hire. 42 Such an agreement is, however, relevant to the issue of whether the copyright was subsequently tran~erred1 3 Notwithstanding the initial ownership of copyright, under Section 201, the copyright to a work for hire can be transferred from the "author" to another party, including the creator. ' The characterization of both the relationship and of the work is of paramount importance as it determines who is the author, which in turn determines who owns the initial copyright. Yet, the characterization is not one that can be made by the parties. The parties cannot contractually determine whether a work is or is not one for hire. Rather, the determination is made by a court after making a factual inquiry. 
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determine whether a creator was an employee. The Ninth Circuit 2 used a multifactor test to hold that only formal, salaried employees were "employees" within the meaning of the 1976 Act. Under this view, independent contractors and freelance artists would never be considered "employees" within the meaning of the work for hire doctrine.
3
The United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflicting appellate decisions when it granted certiorari in Reid. 54 In that case, the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), a nonprofit charitable organization, engaged a sculptorJames Earl Reid, to create a statue depicting the plight of the homeless.
5
" After the statute was completed, each party claimed copyright ownership. CCNV brought suit. The district court found that the sculpture was a work for hire under Section 101 of the Copyright Act. 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and remanded, holding that the sculpture was not a work for hire. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. In doing so, it relied upon the general common law of agency and the agency principles set forth in the Restatement Second in applying a multifactor test to determine whether a hired party was an employee.
5 7 The Supreme Court noted that although no one factor is determinative, the nonexhaustive relevant criteria include the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; and whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party.
8
In rejecting the "actual control" and "right to control" tests, the Supreme Court stated that there was no statutory support for a dichotomy between commissioned works that are actually supervised and controlled by the hiring party, and those that are not. 59 In addition, the Court noted that Section 101(1) does not support the argument that the term "employee" should include only formal, salaried employees.
'
52 See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 , 1102 (9th Cir. 1989 School) . 63 The purposes of the School were to "teach the science and art of the dance," and "in conjunction with the conduct of the school,. . . to compose, perform and demonstrate, and to commission the composition, performance and demonstration of dances, ballets, dramas, and music .... ,"4 The Center, a notfor-profit corporation,"' operated as an umbrella organization encompassing the School 66 and the defendants were treated by the district court and the appellate court as one entity.
67
While the not-for-profit Center and the public arts-oriented School made for sympathetic defendants, the beneficiary-plaintiff, Ronald Protas, made a rather unappealing plaintiff. The court notes that Graham met Protas when she was in her seventies and he was twenty-six. 6 Id. To minimize confusion, in this Article, unless otherwise noted, the "Center" will be used to refer to the Center and the School together as one entity. Although he was a fiduciary of the defendants, Protas was aware of his personal interests and the potential for conflict. Protas wrote: "I want to do everything possible to strengthen my position, in terms of Martha's will, board people and the sets.",
71
Despite his lack of experience in dance, "Protas became an increasingly important figure at the Center., 72 His arrival was "followed shortly by resignations, requested by Graham, of longstanding members of the board who had personal knowledge of the Center's history., 73 Testimony at trial indicated that Protas falsified board minutes, had "easy access to" and "borrowed" Center funds without permission (and without repayment).
74
In her last will, Graham named Protas her executor and bequeathed to him her personal property and her residuary estate, including "any rights or interests in any dance works, musical scores, scenery sets, [Graham's] personal papers and the use of [Graham's] name."
7 5 The will was signed two years before her death at the age of ninety-six.
76
Protas became Artistic Director of the Center after Graham's death in 1991. The following year, Protas asserted ownership of copyrights in all of Graham's dances. 77 In 1998, he placed the copyrights in a revocable trust (the Trust) "that he had created and of which he was trustee and sole beneficiary., 7 In 2000, under pressure from donors, Protas was removed as Artistic Director of the Center. 79 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit framed the issue before it as "whether the work-for-hire doctrine applies to works created by the principal employee of a corporation that was, in the Appellants' view, created to serve the creative endeavors of an artisticgenius. , 85 The court noted that the applicable principles of the work for hire doctrine under both the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act 8 6 operated as default rules in the event that a contract did not specify ownership. The Graham II court discussed the factors applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Reid and noted that the Second Circuit had accorded "particular significance" to the following factors: "(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party." 88 The Court stated that under the 1976 Act, "a person's status as an employee renders a work created within the scope of employment as a work for hire, as to which the copyright belongs to the employer (in the absence of a contract providing otherwise).' It then proceeded to examine whether Graham's dances created from 1978 through 1991 were works for hire within the 1976 Copyright Act. 90 First, the Court determined whether Graham was an "employee." It noted that during [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] 
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9 ' During this time, the Center withheld income and social security taxes from her salary and reimbursed her, for personal expenses, travel, and medical benefits.
92 She created her dances at the Center, with the Center's resources, and her choreography was a regular activity of the Center. 93 The Court conceded that the Center did not exercise much control over Graham's activities, but noted that "the absence of exercise of control did not mean an artist is not an employee where other factors weigh in favor of finding an employment relationship. 9 4 Protas argued that the work for hire doctrine was inapplicable because of Graham's central role with the Center.
9 Thus, even if she was "technically a salaried employee" who "choreographed dances at the Center's expense," she did so only as she saw fit. 96 The Amici Curiae 97 framed the issue more pointedly as whether the work for hire doctrine should be applied "where the putative 'employer' is a not-for-profit corporation formed for the purpose of encouraging and supporting authors in their creative endeavors."
98
The court itself acknowledged its judicial bind:
We understand [the appellants'] point that where a corporation is formed for the purpose of fostering a supportive environment in which an employed artist will have the opportunity to create new works, the default rule should leave the copyrights in the new works Id. a 639. Some might argue that Ms. Graham should not be permitted to selectively recognize the benefits of such a legal entity without suffering any of the constraints but such arguments ignore that most businesses are created for exactly that reason-to free their owners from potential operational liabilities and management decisions. The issue of corporate alter egos should be distinguished from the issue of work for hire. Granting Ms. Graham ownership of her choreographed works is a far cry from permitting her to use the Center's funds as her own private checkbook, for example. Legitimate businesses may permit their employees to retain intellectual property rights by contract. Thus, if Ms. Graham had known that her choreographed works would be interpreted as works for hire and owned, not by her, but by the Center, she might have signed an agreement with the Center clarifying the issue of ownership or maybe even put a similar ownership statement in the by-laws of the Center.
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with the employee and place on the employer the burden of pursuing a contract to obtain her copyrights. Whatever the intrinsic merit of such an approach, we conclude that its adoption is a matter of legislative choice for Congress in the future, not statutory interpretation for a court at present.
9
The Court struggled with the issue of the Center's lack of control over Graham's work, stating that "[t]he fact that Graham was extremely talented understandably explains the Center's disinclination to exercise control over the details of her work, but does not preclude the sort of employee relationship that results in a work for hire."'" The Court concluded that Graham was an employee with a contractual duty to create dances 1 and that the choreographed dances were therefore, works for hire.
2
Whatever qualms the Court may have had about the effect of its decision on creative arts policy, its holding in light of the facts before it is morally satisfying. The plaintiff Protas was depicted as selfish and dishonest.°3 The district court judge, Miriam Cederbaum, flatly stated that "[o]n the material facts, I found Protas not to be a credible witness"'" and noted his "evasive and inconsistent testimony" and untrustworthy demeanor.1 05 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, finding that "the District Court did not err in granting the Defendants' counterclaim for breach of Protas's fiduciary duty to the Center." ' 6 A decision in his favor would have prevented the Center from performing the dances, to the detriment of the public. Intervenor-Defendant Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, supported the Center's position that the public interest was aligned with the Center's right to perform the dances.
7 In addition to 99 Id. at 640.
100 Id. at 642.
.01 Having established that Graham was an employee during this time, the Court does not expressly discuss whether the dances were created within the scope of employment, presumably because it has already discussed this issue with respect to the pre-1978 dances.
102 Graham II, 380 F.3d at 640.
103 For example, the Court notes that there "was evidence that Protas ignored questions that surfaced from several sources about his ownership of the dances, sets, and costumes, and made assertions regarding ownership of these items to the Center's board of directors and to third parties. These assertions were, at best, irresponsibly made, and, at worst, intentionally misleading." Id. at 646. The Court further found that "Protas licensed and sold properties that did not belong to him, for his own enrichment." Id [Vol. Yet, the Graham decision establishes a troubling precedent that becomes evident by examining the effect if Graham herself had been the plaintiff."
9 The
Center and the School were established so that Graham could free herself from funding and legal matters." 0 Graham was not just another employee of the defendants; she was the most important one. The eponymous School and Center were created solely to teach and perform her dances and dance techniques. In the actual case, Graham was never compelled to leave the employ of the Center because there was no reason to. The purpose of the defendants was to assist Graham in the creation of her works and there appeared to be no significant divergence in interests. The defendants' deference to Graham's wishes even explains Protas's rise to power, despite his lack of qualifications."' The " The opinion of the court was restrained when compared to descriptions of Protas in media publications. One publication commented that Protas was "perhaps the most reviled person in dance" and that his "erratic, ingratiating, spiteful, dissembling, un-mindful, vindictive, simpering and quite possibly demented personality" have been on trial. Graham "gave" her dances to the Center because she understood that the Center would handle the administrative and business issues related to them while enabling her to focus her attention on their creation." 3 The Center, on the other hand, gave Graham broad discretion and complied with her wishes.
Ironically, the court's holding that the dances she created were "works made for hire," would have enabled the defendants to legally wrest creative control over those dances away from Graham even if she had been alive. The court's ruling means that the defendants could have hired choreographers from other backgrounds to alter Graham's works without her permission and even against her wishes. If Graham had left her position as an employee of the Center, she would have been prevented from using any of her dances in subsequent productions. This curtailment of her creative activity would likely have limited her future employability.
The Graham II court rendered a decision that ignores the intent of the parties in entering into the employment relationship. Graham was not creating dances requested by the defendants for the benefit of the defendants. Rather, the corporation existed solely to facilitate Graham's creation of the dances for the public good. Yet, the court's decision is the only correct one given both the factual circumstances and the constraints of 17 U.S.C. § § 101 and 201 (b). Under the current legislation, a finding that a work is one "for hire," means that, absent a written agreement otherwise, the employer/author is the sole owner of the copyright. On the other hand, a finding that the work is not one "for hire" would have given the copyright to the dances to Protas, who clearly intended to prevent the Center from performing the dances. This result is contrary to Graham's intent. She was an employee of the Center at the time of her death and had never indicated that she wished to sever ties with the defendants or diminish their right to use any of her work. In fact, her will reveals that she retained good will toward the defendants, even if she did not make them the beneficiary of her estate: .. 2 At trial, Jeanette Roosevelt, a former member of the Board of the Center and former President of the Center and of the School, credibly testified that the Executive Administrator of the Center, the principal managerial employee of the defendants and a board member of the School, "was very loyal to Graham and was concerned that her wishes be met." Id. at 574. Graham did not specifically state whether she believed that the dances at issue were part of her estate, and it is unclear whether this failure was because she assumed that they were or were not, or whether it was the product of a mistaken belief that it did not matter because the interests of Protas and the defendants were aligned. Graham does not seem to have labored much over her will. Her attorney testified that he prepared it in less than an hour, and that he was not asked to conduct an investigation as to what intellectual property Graham owned." 5 A corporate entity may be created for any legitimate business purpose." 6 In this case, the Center was created for the purpose of handling the business affairs of Ms. Graham in order for her to devote her energies to the creative aspects of dance. The court's decision, however, ignores the understanding between the parties and undermines this purpose by divesting the creator of the work from the ownership of the dances, thus barring her from their subsequent development. In most cases, the implications of granting ownership to the Center would have little practical impact as the Center is, or was, subject to Ms. Graham's control. But one can imagine more problematic scenarios. For example, imagine that Ms. Graham were still alive but that the Center had been dissolved due to bankruptcy. The court's judgment permits her works to be sold to creditors as assets of the corporation. The court's decision renders the default in favor of the Center, despite the evidence indicating that the failure to contractually transfer ownership to Ms. Graham, or to provide for joint ownership, was the result of oversight rather than deliberation. 116 See MOD. Bus. CORP. AcT § 3.01 (2002) (providing that "every corporation under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation").
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Not only does the court's decision appear to undermine the original intent of the parties, it also defeats the objective of the Copyright Act to encourage artistic creation. In the example above, because Ms. Graham does not own the rights to the works that she created while an employee of the Center, she would have no right to reuse any of the choreography, including any copyrightable portion of a dance sequence without a license from the Center. This restriction on her ability to reuse certain copyrightable dance sequences or movements would also have prevented her from creating derivative works which would certainly have stifled her creative energies and artistic expression. As a result, a dispirited Ms. Graham would likely have had a very hard time finding subsequent employment.
The Graham II decision fails to implement the intent of the parties with respect to the nature of Graham's employment relationship and the ownership of the dances. Yet the problem with the Graham II decision originates, not from the court's rationale, but from the statute itself. Because the statute does not permit or recognize shared ownership or license grants, a contrary decision would have resulted in injury to the public's interest in viewing Graham's dances. In short, the Graham II court made the best decision it could given the limitations of the work for hire doctrine.
Employment and the Academic. a. Professor Miller and Harvard Law School
Several years ago, Concord Law School, a virtual institution, hired a Harvard Law School professor, Arthur Miller, to produce a lecture series on Civil Procedure."
7 Harvard Law School claimed that it owned the copyright to Miller's lectures and therefore, either Miller should be enjoined from working for Concord or Harvard should receive a share of the revenue from those lectures."
8 Miller countered that the lecture materials belonged to him, and that although Harvard was his employer, it did not own everything that he created."
9 The Harvard-Miller dispute raises several interesting issues regarding whether academic work belongs to the creator employee or to the institution employer.
i. The TeacherException. As discussed above, the work for hire doctrine makes the hiring employer the author of a work created by an employee unless otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing. Some courts, however, have established a teacher exception to the work for hire doctrine which enables professors to retain the copyright to their lectures and scholarly works. 
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12 ' As illustrated by the Harvard-Miller dispute however, advances in technology now make it possible for educators and educational institutions to derive significant revenue from such work."
2 As a result, some schools are claiming copyright ownership of work product created by their professors.' 23 Currently, it is uncertain whether a teacher exception would survive a challenge by an institution under the work for hire doctrine.
124
The Copyright Act does not acknowledge such an exception. In Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, Judge Posner noted that
[t]o a literalist of statutory interpretation, the conclusion that the Act abolished the exception may seem inescapable. The argument would be that academic writing, being within the scope of academic employment, is work made for hire, per se; so, in the absence of an express written and signed waiver of the academic employer's rights, the copyright in such writing must belong to the employer.,
Yet, Posner recognized that such a conclusion would wreak havoc in academic institutions due to "the lack of fit between the policy of the work-for-hire 1091 , 1093 -94 (7th Cir. 1987 ) ("The copyright law gives an employer the full rights in an employee's 'work for hire,'... unless a contract provides otherwise. The statute is general enough to make every academic article a 'work for hire' and therefore vest exclusive control in universities rather than scholars."). See also Holmes & Levin, supra note 16, at 165. See also Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that "it is widely believed that the 1976 Act abolished the teacher exception," even if it was probably inadvertent).
125 Hays, 847 F.2d at 416.
doctrine and the conditions of academic production, and the absence of any indication that Congress meant to abolish the teacher exception" and stated that "if forced to decide the issue" the court might conclude that the exception had survived the 1976 Act. 126 Yet, the Seventh Circuit ultimately decided that it was not so forced: "We need not try to decide the issue in the present case, for even if the statute abolished the teacher exception this would not necessarily spell victory for Sony.
1 2 7 Posner's acknowledgment and discussion of the existence of both a need for a teacher exception as well as a lack of statutory support for such an exception is yet another example of the judicial quandary created by the work for hire doctrine.
The independence of academics would be severely impacted if the scholarship or course materials that they produced are deemed to be work for hire. Professors, a particularly itinerant group, would be restricted from using any of their lecture notes or course materials when they moved from one institution to another. In the well-known case Williams v. Weisser, 128 a UCLA professor brought a copyright infringement action against the publisher of "class notes." The California Court of Appeals, in holding that the professor retained the copyright to his lectures, stated:
Professors are a peripatetic lot, moving from campus to campus. The courses they teach begin to take shape at one institution and are developed and embellished at another.... Plaintiff testified that the notes on which his lectures were based were derived from a similar course which he had given at another university. If defendant is correct, there must be some rights of that school which were infringed at UCLA. Further, should plaintiff leave UCLA and give a substantially similar course at his next post, UCLA would be able to enjoin him from using the material which, according to defendant, it owns.
129
Academics tend to develop a body of scholarship that builds upon and borrows from earlier thoughts, writing, and lectures. Given the way that academic work is developed, ownership of such work by universities would raise difficult pragmatic issues with respect to how to define such ownership and how to determine any infringement. 13 126 
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In the absence of a teacher exception to the work for hire doctrine, the institution-employer might be deemed to own the rights to any scholarly works written during employment hours. For an academic, the hours of employment are typically ill-defined and unlikely to be interpreted as solely between nine o'clock in the morning and five o'clock in the evening. Thus, an institutionemployer would have the right to modify any materials, including works of scholarship, produced by its faculty even if such modifications are contrary to the beliefs or views held by the writer.
As sound as the teacher exception may be, the nature of academic writings, the express language of 17 U.S.C. § 101 and the Supreme Court's holding in Reid might result in a finding that academic writings are works for hire. First, using common law principles of agency as required by Reid, professors would almost certainly be considered employees of their university.
3 ' While university employers rarely have control over scholarly output, they do provide faculty with benefits, facilities and tools, and an ongoing relationship.' 32 Furthermore, while universities do not "assign" scholarship topics, they are in the business of producing academic research.' 33 Thus, if the writings are prepared by the professor within the scope of the employment, then they will be considered for hire.M A determination of whether a work is prepared within the scope of employment requires consideration of factors such as the type of work the professor was hired to perform, whether the writing was prepared during working hours and at the employer's office, and whether the preparation of the work was subject to the employer's control or motivated by an effort to please the employer.
3 A strong argument could be made that academic writings meet these [IIf we assume that universities generally own or at least can control the copyright output of their academic employees, how is that control to be profitably and practically exercised. Using the Williams v. Weisser example, Professor Williams, when hired to teach anthropology at UCLA, brought with him a body of personalized theory, notes, and other material on which he based his teaching. Did UCLA own this preexisting material by virtue of his employment? Hardly. His academic and scholarly output began elsewhere, was refined at UCLA when he was employed there, and was influenced by the input of his students, UCLA peers, and those of his colleagues at other institutions around the country. This itinerant and fugitive nature of academic scholarship is a type of intellectual ferae naturae. Scully, supra note 124, at 263. Furthermore, while a teacher exception may be warranted to enable professors to reuse or further develop scholarship and lectures created at former places of employment, it is unclear why academics should be able to receive subsequent compensation for work created in the scope of employment whereas other employees cannot. In other words, why should Arthur Miller be able to get paid by Concord University for the same lecture he prepared for Harvard while he is still an employee of Harvard? This is not a situation where Miller left Harvard and went to another institution, bringing with him the materials he prepared while employed at Harvard. In such a case, the teacher exception is justified because of the peculiarities of the academic profession. But why should Miller be allowed to profit twice from the same work when an engineer, for example, would not be able to create a software program for one company and then create that same program for another company? The teacher exception was intended to embody the norms of academia and protect the expectations of academics and their analyzing scope of employment.
136 See generaly Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 590. See also Laughlin, supra note 123, at 576 ("[1]t is hard to imagine that a court would find that faculty created scholarly articles, books and teaching materials are not prepared within the scope of employment.").
137 Dreyfuss, spra note 17, at 598-99.
institutions. It should not be used to privilege professors where the benefit is not unique to academia. On the other hand, it seems reasonable that should Miller leave Harvard, he should be able to take his writings, including his lectures, with him to his new institution. It is generally understood, however, that an engineer leaving an employer would not be able to take work product to a subsequent employer. The work for hire doctrine reflects the expectations of the engineer and employer, but it does not reflect the expectations of professors and academic institutions. While the teacher exception attempts to reflect the norms of academia, it privileges professors even in situations where the subsequent use of the work is for pecuniary purposes only-in other words, in situations where professors are no different, and should therefore be treated no differently, from other employees. It does not protect nonacademic employees who may have a reasonable belief that they can modify or reuse a work they created, and who may have been misled by an employer in this regard. Furthermore, as noted earlier, there is strong support that the 1976 Copyright Act abolished the teacher exception. 1 3 8 Part III proposes amendments to the work for hire doctrine that would address the issues raised by both the creative genius and academic employee situations.
III. PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE "ALL OR NOTHING" APPROACH OF THE WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE
The statute defining work for hire requires the judiciary to restrict its analysis to: (1) characterizing the relationship between the hiring party and the creator; and (2) categorizing the work being created. The statute as currently drafted does not permit the court to delve into the intent or the expectations of the parties nor does it provide for the option of shared ownership or a license grant from one party to the other. Thus, if a work is deemed to be a work made for hire, the employer is the author of such work and the copyright vests in the employer, 139 regardless of the intent of the parties or the custom or practice in a particular industry. In other words, even if the parties had agreed that the employee would "' See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 413 (7th Cir. 1988 ) (noting that it was "widely believed" that the 1976 Copyright Act abolished the teacher exception but that since there was no mention in the legislative history of an intent to abolish the exception, it was probably done inadvertently). [i]n the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
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own the copyright and the employer would have an exclusive license to use the work product, if the work is in fact a work for hire under the Copyright Act, such an agreement would be effective only if subsequently transferred in writing'" by the author regardless of any understanding of the parties to the contrary. 1 ' The all or nothing nature of the work for hire doctrine results in decisions that leave a clear winner and a clear loser, even if such a result defeats the reasonable expectations of the parties.
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The impact of this default in favor of the employer is aggravated by the employer's superior bargaining power and access to information. In many cases, the employer is aware of the work for hire doctrine and its implications. A typical employee, however, is often unaware that such a doctrine exists. 43 Nevertheless, the existing statutory default in favor of the employer reflects the reasonable expectations of the parties if it conforms to industry practice.
For example, a software engineer probably realizes that when she leaves her employer to work for a competitor, she will not be permitted to share code that she has previously developed. While she may be unaware of the existence of the doctrine of work for hire, she is well aware of the norms in her industry which prohibit this type of sharing.
The work for hire doctrine is a default provision which applies in those situations where the parties have failed to expressly address the issue of intellectual property ownership in a written agreement.'" This Section proposes amendments to two provisions of the Copyright Act which minimize the '-17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) provides that "ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law...." Under 17 U.S.C. § 204(a), a "transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent. 14 The author contends that the parties should always be permitted to expressly agree to terms which avoid the effect of the work for hire doctrine. The enforceability of such an agreement would continue to be subject to the standard contract defenses, such as fraud. The amendment requires a written agreement in order to establish that a work, or specified works, by an employee are works for hire. In the event that there is no written agreement between the employer and the employee, the work would not be considered work for hire and the employee would be the author. This reversal actually reflects the basic precept under Section 201(a) of the Copyright Act that the copyright initially vests in the creator of the work' 45 and diminishes the difference in treatment of work created by employees and independent contractors. 146 There would remain an important distinction, however, between independent contractors and employees. While only certain statutorily-defined types of work may be considered for hire where the creator is an independent contractor, any work created by an employee would be considered work for hire, provided that there is a written agreement.' 47 As discussed in Part II, the factual circumstances of the parties' relationship currently govern the categorization of work, not the understanding of the parties.
145 See also Sandier, supra note 117, at 247 (stating that the work for hire doctrine is an exception to the basic philosophy of the copyright law).
146 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
" Only the following types of work may be considered work for hire where the creator is an independent contractor work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
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Thus, even if the parties expressly agree that a particular work is not a work for hire, if the creating party is an employee and the work is created within the scope of the employment, then the employer is the author notwithstanding any agreement of theparties to the contrary. In the absence of a written agreement between the parties, the employer, which typically has greater knowledge of the law governing work for hire, can potentially take unfair advantage of the existing statutory default. For example, assume that Sally is a copywriter for an advertising agency. She is also a poet. In an effort to elicit from Sally her "best work," her employer tells her that she is free to submit any copy that she writes for the agency to literary magazines. As a result, Sally pours her heart and soul into the copy that she writes for the agency. Notwithstanding the understanding between Sally and her employer, Sally does not have the right to submit any poems to literary magazines because she is not the owner of the copyright to those poems. 1 4 8 If her employer subsequently refused to transfer in writing the copyright to Sally, she would be in an unenviable position with respect to her ability to enforce her employer's promise.
Reversal of the statutory default would address the knowledge imbalance typical in individual employment negotiations but would still allow an employer to be the author of the work provided that there is an express written agreement to that effect. The impact on business would be minimal considering that most businesses that hire "creative" employees already have them sign employment agreements containing work for hire provisions. 149 The software engineer, for example, mentioned in the preceding Section is likely bound by an employment agreement containing both a nondisclosure as well as a work for hire provision to safeguard against a later finding by the judiciary that she was not, in fact, an employee as the parties might have believed. Given the court's focus on the existence of an employment relationship, it is simply wise business policy to require written agreements with all individuals working for the company. Thus, even if someone that an employer considered to be an "employee" is found by a court to be an independent consultant, work created by that individual may still be considered "for hire" if there is a written agreement to that effect. Furthermore, because creations are often patentable, many employers already 14 Most publishers require that contributors be the lawful copyright owners of work that they submit. Therefore, in order for Sally to be able to submit the poems, her employer would need to transfer ownership to her pursuant to a written agreement. 
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include provisions assigning intellectual property rights in their employment agreements.' 0 Requiring a written agreement to evidence that a work is for hire would likely not result in a sea change of creative works owned by employees. It may only result in more agreements. Yet, a contractual provision making express the ownership by the employer of any employee created work product would bring to the employee's attention the rights of authorship that are being abdicated and perhaps increase the employee's bargaining power with respect to other benefits. In any event, it would provide information that enhances the decision-making abilities of both parties. The current work for hire doctrine is fair only if the employee is aware of it. In reality, however, most employees have never heard of the doctrine, and many of those who have misunderstand what it means. Requiring a written contract that expressly states that the employee's works shall be work for hire corrects, at least to some extent, the bargaining imbalance inherent in potential employment situations.
2. Amendment to 17 U.S.C. f 201-Enforcing the Reasonable Expectations of the Parties. Although requiring a written agreement to establish work for hire is a step in the right direction, alone it is insufficient to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties. In many situations, the parties anticipate some sort of shared use of the work product which is defeated by the all or nothing nature of 17 U.S.C.
§ 101. For example, in the case of Martha Graham, it seems unlikely that either Graham or the Center expected that she would be terminated or that she would voluntarily resign as an employee of the Center. The primary purpose of the Center was to facilitate her creative endeavors, and evidence demonstrates that the Center recognized that objective and made every effort to accommodate her wishes. Yet, the parties probably also intended for the Center to be able to have performed the dances that Graham created while an employee of the Center. A court decision in favor of the plaintiff Protas would likely have defeated the expectations of both Graham and the Center in that the Center would not have been able to have Graham's dances performed without receiving Protas's permission. This requirement would have limited the Center's ability to modify and develop her dances without the consent of Protas. Similarly, while academics may justifiably use previously developed lecture materials and scholarship, there may be instances where a university may reasonably wish to use or develop materials created by former employees. A professor may work with other members of the faculty to create materials for courses that would continue to be offered after the professor's employment
